

**CHIP-5**  
 Concepts and history in psychology

Types of explanation (cont.)

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<http://www.psy.gla.ac.uk/~steve/courses/chip.html>

CHIP-5 6 March 2012 1

**Argument structures**

This set of slides is about argument structures.

There is not one single structure for scientific arguments;

Disciplines often focus on only one or two formats: but is this a weakness?

Can the convention holding sway in a given discipline at a given time obstruct or prevent progress?

What about psychology?

2

**Reminder: the Newtonian triad**

- 1) A theory
- 2) Calculation / prediction: generate testable consequences from the theory. (A theory that can explain anything implies we shouldn't think any more, or learn any more.)
- 3) Observation, experiment

Some schemas:

- Falsifiability → must be able to do 2, then 3
- Induction → take existing 3 and generate 1.
- Similarly the method of examples and counterexamples uses existing 3 to check 1: allows tests of theories without new 3. E.g. my arguments about emotion.

3

**Argument schemas (0)**

*This slide may or may not belong here; or earlier lecture?*

Four classes of inference (reasoning, argument types):

1. Deduction: Certain; usually from general to particular
2. Induction: from cases to a generalisation (never certain)
3. Abduction: to the best explanation: (SherlockH)
4. Transcendental: necessary explanation. Arguing what must be true of all possible cases/worlds.

4

**Argument schemas (1)**

Kuhn focussed on non-rational aspects of actual scientific research communities.

Disciplines often focus on only one or two formats for scientific arguments: but is this a weakness?

Can the convention holding sway in a given discipline at a given time obstruct or prevent progress?

Ted Nield pointed out (for geology) how a discipline at a particular time may only allow one of the possible argument types to be published, and this sometimes obstructs the publication of vital arguments. This kind of restriction is, say, semi-rational: a convention based on methodological problems but perhaps adhered to too rigidly.

5

**Nield on Geology's Argument schemas**

Nield (2007) has a bit on the influence of argument schemas in Geology and its obstruction to accepting the theory of continental drift and plate tectonics.

The Americans admired induction: real practical and objective fact gathering, from which generalisations might cautiously be made later; and despised grand European theorising from an armchair, which added no observations (no empirical content) and discarded evidence that didn't fit. (pp. 131-3)

Couldn't get US funding if it said it was testing deductions from theories, only if it looked like induction: getting new information and discussing it against multiple theories. (pp. 143-5)

6

### Argument schemas (2)

E.g. Darwin's book "Origin of species"

- Proposed one theory, discussed all the supporting evidence
- But surely it had no experimental support, testing?

- Later biologists do evolutionary experimental work e.g. given a hypothesis that urban moths are soot-coloured, they might artificially colour moths and look at differential predation.
- We need to recognise that some disciplines may publish more than one kind of argument schema. E.g. a grand theory, then experimental tests of its predictions.
- The importance of grand theories is that they look at large collections of evidence as a whole, and seek to find a single synthesis that accommodates it all.  
Paul Nurse's point that many "cranks" e.g. climate change deniers are essentially selecting just a few observations that suit their view. This is legitimate from the viewpoint of counterexample arguments; but ....

7

### Some argument schemas (3)

Obs = observation/dataset  
th. = (general) theory  
hyp = (specific) hypothesis / prediction  
The new element being published is in red  
=> shows the conclusion, if any, being asserted.

- Propose one grand theory, discuss all the supporting evidence (Darwin) [1 th., <= N obs.]
- Theory vs. theory (Popper). Decisive experiments. Two theories, one observation. [2 th., 1 obs. => 1 th.]
- Report one set of observations, discuss multiple alternative theories to explain them. [N th. 1 obs.]
- Publish observations without theory? [0 th. 1 obs.]

(LT seating DOI: 10.1119/1.1845987) E.g. lecture theatre seating

8

### Lecture theatre seating


Students were randomly assigned seating for a course (reversed at mid-semester)

Significant effect on eventual course grade of whether in front quarter vs. back quarter in the first half of term.

This is a case, rare in psych., of an observation with NO theory or hypothesis. The authors are physicists: perhaps with an appreciation of the difference between a fact and a theory.


Perkins, K.K. and Wieman, C.E. (2005) "The Surprising Impact of Seat Location on Student Performance" *The Physics Teacher* vol.43 January pp.30-33

Attendance: —>



9

### Lecture theatre seating: Course grades



10

### Some argument schemas (4)

- Propose one hypothesis, discuss evidence for and against (CT)  
[ 1 hyp, <= N obs.]
- Pure deduction (theory extension) (a lot of theoretical physics) e.g. Hawkins, black holes. [ 1 hyp. <= 1 th.]  
? e.g. cognitive dissonance
- Explanation of an old phenomenon (old puzzle), showing which deduction from an existing theory explains it. (Feynman, sprites, cosmic ray flashes) [1 obs, 1 hyp, 1 th.] (Abduction)

11

### Argument schemas (5)

Veyne suggests that History and (Weberian) Sociology are almost identical, but that:

- History centres on events, uses theories to explain the observations  
[g] Take event (an obs.), select one theory, then explain (like Feynman)  
[ 1 obs, 1 hyp, 1 theory]  
[b] Or perhaps contrast 2 theories, like Popper [1 obs, 2 th.]
- [a] Sociology centres on a theory, uses /selects events to illustrate or prove it.  
[cf. Darwin: 1 th. N obs.]

12

## Argument schemas (6)

### What of psychology?

It tends to do theory in literature review articles [a]

It does do a few decisive experiments, choosing between 2 theories. [b]

It is bad at publishing unexplained phenomena (but: visual illusions) [d]

It doesn't do much of any of the schemas above. Instead ...

[x] It most often seems to publish lab reports: assert a theory, assert the experiment tests it, assert the results confirm the theory. [ 1 obs, 1 hyp, => 1 theory]

The most common weak point, it seems to me, is "prediction": establishing a reliable link between the theory and how it is operationalised (into a hypothesis) in the experiment. The giant leaps from the actual expt. manipulation to the theoretical description of what matters about the difference in the treatments.